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In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' the Supreme Court held that a
state's prohibition of advertising by attorneys was unconstitutional as
applied to a newspaper advertisement setting forth fees for certain rou-
tine legal services. Bates is necessarily the foundation upon which one
must base any judgment regarding the legality of restraints upon physi-
cians' advertising.
Restraints on advertising potentially violate two distinct legal
commands-the first amendment and the Sherman Act 2 -both of
which were considered by the Bates Court. The plaintiff in Bates ulti-
mately prevailed on the basis of the first amendment. The Sherman Act
claim was rejected on the ground that since the Sherman Act was not
intended to reach the direct action of a state,3 the Arizona Supreme
Court's actions in adopting and enforcing the advertising ban4 were not
within the scope of the Act. This Article will first examine the Bates
decision and then analyze the first amendment and Sherman Act impli-
cations for restraints on advertising by physicians.
I. BATES: SUCCESS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
The first amendment challenge in Bates rested heavily on a
Supreme Court decision of the previous term, Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.' The Court in
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. Professor Canby was counsel for appellants
Bates and O'Steen in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
3. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). See generally Comment, The State Action
Exemption in Antitrust: From Parker v. Brown to Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 1977 DuKE L.J.
871.
4. The State Bar of Arizona is under the direction and control of the Supreme Court of
Arizona. ARz. Sup. CT. R. 17(a). Because all persons licensed to practice law in Arizona also
must be members of the state bar, ARuz. REV. STAT. § 32-261 (1976), all Arizona attorneys are
subject to its rules.
5. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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that case extended its growing protection of commercial speech 6 to a
simple advertised offer to sell "the X prescription drug at the Y Price."'7
The Court rejected arguments that the state's ban on such drug price
advertising was essential to preserve professionalism and high quality
of service by pharmacists.' It noted that commercial advertisements
contain information important to individual consumer decision mak-
ing, which is in turn important to the allocation of resources in a free
market economy.9
The question in Bates was whether the Court would adhere to its
recently announced protection of commercial speech in the case of the
more traditional profession of law. It did, but by a bare majority. Two
additional Justices would have permitted some advertising by attor-
neys, but not that of fees for specific services.' An analysis of the
Court's reasoning is important to an understanding of Batei potential
application to physicians.
The majority opinion in Bates reiterated the reasoning of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy and its emphasis on the value of advertising
to the individual and the economy. 1 The Court then systematically re-
jected several proffered justifications for the advertising prohibition. It
stated that advertising would not degrade the profession in either the
attorneys' or the public's eyes; the public knows that attorneys make
money at their calling. 2 Nor would it lead to shoddy services; the at-
torney who is inclined to cut quality to increase profits will do so
whether or not he advertises.' 3 The Court also found that advertising
should not be prohibited even if it resulted in increased litigation be-
6. In stating that "the notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' [has] all but passed from
the scene," 425 U.S. at 759, the Court in Virginia State BA ofPharmacy completed a dramatic first
amendment development. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), had long stood for the
proposition that purely commercial speech was not protected by the first amendment. Id. at 54-55.
The Valentine doctrine, however, was often criticized, even by members of the Court. See Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 n.6 (1975). The first hint of the erosion of the doctrine appeared in
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), in which a
newspaper unsuccessfully attempted to assert in the face of a restrictive city ordinance a first
amendment interest in its classified ads. Two years later in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975), the Court reversed a criminal conviction for violating a statute prohibiting the circulation
of any publication promoting abortion services. In affording first amendment protection to this
commercial speech, the Court stated that the "relationship of speech to the marketplace of prod-
ucts. . . does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas." 421 U.S. at 826.
7. 425 U.S. at 761.
8. Id. at 768-69.
9. Id. at 763-65.
10. 433 U.S. at 389 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, J.).
11. Id. at 374-75.
12. Id. at 368-69.
13. Id. at 378.
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cause use of the courts is not an evil. 14 Nor was there any convincing
evidence that advertising would have adverse economic effects, either
by increasing the costs to the consumer or by providing a barrier to
entering attorneys.15 On the contrary, the Court viewed advertising as
more likely to bring fees down by competition and by providing a way
for a new attorney to attract clients. The Court was also unconvinced
that abuses of advertising would create an insupportable burden of en-
forcement for the bar.16
To the medical profession, perhaps the most significant part of the
Court's opinion in Bates was its rejection of the contention that adver-
tising of attorneys' services is inherently misleading. The argument was
founded upon several propositions: that legal services are so individu-
alized that they do not permit comparison by way of advertisements;
that the consumer is unable to determine in advance what services he
needs; and that advertisements would highlight irrelevant factors and
would fail to show the relevant factor of skill. To the first point, the
Court answered that those services for which set fees would be adver-
tised were relatively standardized and that the bar association's own
prepaid services plan established set fees for such services.' 7 Although
there would be variations, there would be no deception so long as the
described service was performed for the advertised fee. To the second
proposition, the Court stated:
It is unlikely that many people go to an attorney merely to ascertain
if they have a clean bill of legal health. Rather, attorneys are likely to
be employed to perform specific tasks. Although the client may not
know the detail involved in performing the task, he no doubt is able
to identify the service he desires at the level of generality to which
advertising lends itself.1
8
In response to the third proposition, the Court acknowledged that ad-
vertising does not provide all the information necessary to the selection
of an attorney, but countered that some information is better than
none.19
14. Id. at 375-77.
15. Id. at 377-78.
16. Id. at 379.
17. Id. at 372-73.
18. Id. at 374.
19. Id. The Court went on to hold that it would not invalidate regulation of professional
advertising on grounds of overbreadth; that is, it would not strike down the rule simply because it
might in some potential applications violate the first amendment. Id at 379-81. Any successful
attack on the rule would have to be carried out by a litigant whose own advertisement was entitled
to first amendment protection. The court .held that the Bates advertisement was protected, and
that it was not deceptive in describing the practice as a "legal clinic," in stating that its fees were
"very reasonable," or in failing to state that a lawyer's services were not essential to obtain a
change of name, which was one of the advertised services. Id. at 381-82.
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The Court closed its opinion as it had opened it, with a statement
of the limits of its decision. The case did not deal with advertising the
quality of services, which "may be so likely to be misleading as to war-
rant restriction."2 Nor did it deal with in-person solicitation, which
might be subject to similar objections. It is clear, said the Court, that
false and deceptive advertising may be prohibited, as may the advertis-
ing of transactions that are themselves illegal.2" Time, place and man-
ner restrictions may be imposed, and "the special problems of
advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special con-
sideration."22 All of these disclaimers, then, are likely to represent a
schedule of future litigation as the full import of the Bates decision
develops. The only certain fact is that the Bates advertisement of spe-
cific legal services at stated fees was protected by the first amendment.
II. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PHYSICIAN
ADVERTISING
A. Restraints Upon Physician Advertising.
At its first national convention in 1847, the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA) promulgated a code of professional ethics, which
evolved into the Principles of Medical Ethics.23 The Principles were re-
vised into their present form in 1955. Section 5 provides in pertinent
part: "A physician may choose whom he will serve. . . . He should
not solicit patients." This prohibition against solicitation has for many
years been interpreted to forbid virtually all public advertising by phy-
sicians.24
The Princ~iles of the AMA have routinely been adopted by state
and local medical societies throughout the country. In addition, the
medical licensure laws or regulations of over two-thirds of the states
restrict or prohibit solicitation or advertising.25 As a result, the ethical
restraint against advertising by individual physicians has for all practi-
cal purposes been total.
Actual enforcement of the ban has been left almost entirely to state
and local medical societies; state licensing agencies have generally not
20. Id. at 383-84.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 384.
23. Jonsen & Hellegers, Conceptual Foundationsfor an Ethics ofMedical Care, in ETHICS OF
HEALTH CARE 5 (L. Tancredi ed. 1974).
24. See Complaint of the Federal Trade Commission, AMA, FTC Dkt. No. 9064, [1973-76
Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP (CCH) 21,068 (1975).
25. Brief for the AMA as Amicus Curiae, Appendix A at 11, Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977).
[Vol. 1978:543
PH YSICIA N 4 D VER TISING
exercised their power to revoke the licenses of advertising physicians.
Since the medical societies are organized as nongovernmental bodies,
their ultimate sanction in enforcing codes of ethics is expulsion from
the society. For the physician, that is a severe penalty. Expulsion from
a local medical society may result in the loss of hospital privileges
which are virtually essential to the maintenance of the physician's prac-
tice. Moreover, it will usually dry up referrals, an important source of
patients. Expulsion may also lead to the denial of a specialty certifica-
tion, and to the loss or greatly increased cost of medical malpractice
insurance.26 Policing of the advertising restriction, therefore, has been
very effective.
In 1976, with an eye toward the trend of litigation, the Judicial
Council of the AMA reinterpreted the Principles to permit a limited
degree of advertising. Its statement included the following:
Advertising-The Principles do not proscribe advertising; they
proscribe the solicitation of patients. Advertising means the action of
making information or intention known to the public. The public is
entitled to know the names of physicians, the type of their practices,
the location of their offices, their office hours, and other useful infor-
mation that will enable people to make a more informed choice of
physician.
The physician may furnish this information through the ac-
cepted local media of advertising or communication.... 27
The statement further provided that the physician may supply bio-
graphical information to reputable directories and may include "his
charge for a standard office visit or his fee or range of fees for specific
types of services, provided disclosure is made of the variable and other
pertinent factors affecting the amount of the fee specified."2" False and
misleading advertising, puffery, testimonials and self-laudatory adver-
tising are still prohibited.29
Despite this considerable liberalization by the AMA, restraints
upon advertising today remain as total as ever, because neither the state
and local societies nor the state legislatures and licensing bodies have
adopted the AMA position. Moreover, it is not at all clear that they will
do so voluntarily. Consequently, the issue of the validity of restraints
on physician advertising is still very much alive.
26. A. NICHOLS, THE PRICING OF PHYSICIAN AND LAWYER SERVICES 57 (Univ. Microfilms
Int'l 1975).
27. Statement of the Judicial Council Re: Advertising and Solicitation, 235 J.A.M.A. 2328,
2328 (1976).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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B. State Action.
In order to determine the extent to which the first amendment ap-
plies to physician advertising, it is first necessary to consider whether
the system of regulation involves sufficient state action to trigger consti-
tutional scrutiny. Only if such governmental action is found can the
substantive questions relating to the protection of advertising as com-
mercial speech be reached.30
State and local medical societies might be expected to argue that
their enforcement of their own ethical standards is entirely a private
matter not subject to constitutional scrutiny. Some courts have lent
support to that view. 31 In enforcing the advertising ban, however, the
state and local societies seem certain to be sufficiently infected with
state action to permit application of the first amendment. The state li-
censing bodies and legislatures that have passed regulations or laws
prohibiting advertising are of course acting as the state, and the first
amendment applies to them directly. But these statutes and regulations
also provide the type of governmental encouragement to the medical
societies in enforcing their own bans that might lead a court to con-
clude that such enforcement by the societies cannot be regarded as
wholly private. The Supreme Court has found state action under simi-
lar circumstances in cases of racial discrimination,32 and it is possible
that the Court would also do so in cases involving the first amendment,
despite the likelihood that a more stringent test of state action would be
applied.33
30. The requirement that "state action" be present before the constitutional safeguard is
triggered does not generally pose a problem when the state or its authorized agent is the primary
"actor"; rather, the doctrinal difficulty arises when nominally private parties perform "public
functions" or when the state subsidizes, regulates or cooperates with private parties whose actions
violate constitutional rights. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (licens-
ig and extensive regulation of public utility which has received grant of monopoly from the state
does not make utility state agent); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (leas-
ing of space in a publicly owned parking ramp to restaurant maintaining racial segregation makes
restaurant's actions equivalent to state action; crucial fact is that the state and the private party
were in a "symbiotic relationship"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state action present
when state court grants injunctive relief to private parties seeking to enforce racially restrictive
covenants).
31. Eg., Schooler v. Tarrant County Medical Soe'y, 457 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970);
,f Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946) (private hospital has right to exclude
any physician from practice within the discretion of the management).
32. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970) (repeated actions of state officials may be state action if the custom has the force of law);
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (statements by city officials indicating they would not
tolerate integration found to constitute state action in the absence of statutory command); Peter-
son v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (discriminatory act of private party constitutes state
action when city ordinance requires the result).
33. The Court has recently taken a more restrictive stance regarding state action in cases not
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There are other connections as well between the societies and gov-
ernment which the courts might rely upon to buttress a finding of state
action. The societies frequently participate officially in the selection of
members of the state licensing boards.34 The hospitals from which an
expelled member would be excluded are likely to be partially or en-
tirely funded by government. Informal interdependence between
state and local health departments and the societies may exist in vary-
ing degrees. While any of these connections in itself might not suffice,
the cumulative effect is such that the societies will almost certainly have
to contend with the application of the first amendment to their re-
straints upon advertising.36
C. Physician Advertising as Protected Speech.
Surely the outcome of the Bates case creates a working presump-
tion that the first amendment will invalidate any total ban on profes-
sional advertising. Still, it is appropriate to inquire whether the
reasoning behind Bates applies in full force to physician advertising
and, if not, what other support might exist for an application of the first
amendment.
One of the justifications for the Bates ruling arose from a combi-
nation of consumer ignorance and underutilization of legal services. A
survey conducted by the American Bar Association (ABA) and the
American Bar Foundation indicated that one-third of all Americans
never consulted a lawyer in their lives, and another third did so once. 37
involving racial discrimination. The strongest indication of this development is Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), in which the Court refrained from finding state action on
the basis of the licensing and pervasive governmental regulation of a utility company. Justice
Rehnquist set forth the applicable test for a finding of state action: "mhe inquiry must be whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351. See
also Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
34. A. NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 49-50.
35. A number of cases have dealt with the question whether the receipt of funds under the
Hill-Burton Act (Hospital Survey and Construction Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-I (1970),
makes the actions of a private hospital state action. Under current law, it appears that the mere
receipt of Hill-Burton funds is an insufficient basis for state action, at least in the absence of racial
discrimination. Compare Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974) (alle-
gation that hospital violated due process clause by arbitrary denial of staff privileges) and Doe v.
Bellin Mem. Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973) (right of privacy not violated by refusal of hospi-
tal to perform abortions) with Sinkins v. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) (receipt of Hill-Burton funds makes the discriminatory denial of staff
privileges to a Negro physician state action).
36. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Hawkins v. North Caro-
lina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
37. See B. CuRRAN & F. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 85-86 (Am. Bar
Foundation Prelim. Report 1974).
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Millions of people did not know a lawyer, did not know how to find
one and tended to overestimate what lawyers would charge for their
services.38 Lack of information was consequently an integral part of a
failure of the delivery system for legal services. This failure of delivery
had its own independent constitutional implications, for the Court had
recognized a first amendment and due process right to legal services.39
Suppression of physician advertising, on the other hand, might not
be seen as intimately connected with a failure in the delivery system for
medical services. There is a much higher utilization rate of medical
services than of legal services; the average American receives some sort
of medical attention several times a year.4 0 And while medical services
are clearly important and sometimes vital to the individual, they do not
of themselves enjoy the status of a constitutional right, except for abor-
tion and birth control services.4 1 The goal of increasing the use of phy-
sicians' services consequently does not loom as large as the parallel
consideration in the Bates case. Indeed, an increase in demand for
medical services might well be viewed in part as a social and economic
problem.
Nonetheless, few would contend that the delivery system for medi-
cal services is perfect, or that an increase in the flow of information
might not aid persons who need medical services in finding and choos-
ing a physician. As the AMA has now recognized, advertising can con-
vey information useful to the consumer.42 At the most basic level,
information regarding the location of the physician's office, his hours,
language ability and his specialty, if any, are all obviously helpful to an
individual searching for a physician.
The advertising of specific fees is especially important. Bates, after
all, was a case about the advertising of fees, and in this regard several
points need to be made. First, fee advertising presented the most dis-
tasteful case for a Supreme Court raised in the lawyers' traditions. It
seems clear, for instance, that Justices Powell and Stewart would have
supported the protection of other kinds of advertising;43 it was the ele-
38. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 370 n.22; AM. BAR NEWS, Mar. 1976, at 8.
39. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
40. A. NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 3 (citing U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare,
Public Health Service, Health Services and Mental Health Administration, Physician Visits: Vol-
une and Interval Since Last Visit, United States-1969 in VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 1, 3
(Series 10, No. 75)).
41. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
43. 433 U.S. at 391-95 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, J.).
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ment of price that most concerned them and turned Bates into a 5-4
decision. Yet the first amendment policy arguments are strongest in the
case of price advertising. As the majority opinion recognized, price is
often the most significant single fact for the consumer.44 More impor-
tantly, informed price decisions by individual consumers are the means
of efficiently allocating resources in a free market economy. Price ad-
vertising, as the economic testimony in Bates clearly indicated,45 is pro-
competitive and tends to bring price levels down. All of these factors
were relied upon by the majority to justify applying the first amend-
ment to commercial speech by attorneys. The same elements, of course,
may well be even more significant for antitrust purposes.
The root of these economic arguments, however, is individual con-
sumer choice, and in medicine this choice is not as large a factor as it is
in law. While initial choice of a physician is usually made by the con-
sumer, most of the economically important choices thereafter are made
by the physician. This includes choice of drugs, the hospital to be used
and the duration of its use, other physicians to be consulted, the tests to
be conducted and, of course, the treatment to be given. 6 The patient's
direct interest in these choices is further diminished by the fact that
about two-thirds of all personal health care expenditures are made by
third parties on behalf of the consumer patients. 7 Of these payments,
about sixty percent are made by federal, state or local government; the
remainder are made by private insurers.48 The economic incentive that
normally impels the consumer is accordingly attenuated in the case of
medical services.
These differences in the consumer role from that prevailing in the
field of legal services might tempt one to conclude that the first amend-
ment analysis of Bates is not applicable to physician advertising. In-
deed, if patient choice of physicians did not exist at all, and if this were
thought to be a satisfactory condition, then such a conclusion might
well follow. The Monopolies Commission in England determined that
solicitors should be permitted to advertise49 but that there was no need
to permit barristers to do so because clients never directly employed
barristers; they were employed only by solicitors who, unlike the pub-
44. Id. at 396.
45. Brief for the AMA, supra note 25, Joint Appendix 187-88.
46. Schuck, A Consumer's View ofthe Health Care System, in ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE 110-
12 (L. Tancredi ed. 1974).
47. Id. 103-04.
48. Id.
49. MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, SERVICES OF SOLICITORS IN ENGLAND AND
WALES: A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF SERVICES OF SOLICITORS IN ENGLAND AND WALES IN
RELATION TO RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING (1976).
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lie, were fully informed so as to permit them to make choices among
barristers:50 But patients are not wholly excluded from the choice of
physicians in the United States; the initial choice is most commonly
theirs. Furthermore, there is still a considerable portion of the populace
that is not insured." There is reason to expect that these consumers will
have substantial impact at the margin as they exercise their choices and
seek lower-cost services. The systematic competitive effect of advertis-
ing could thus have a significant effect on the medical profession.
In addition, the dominance of physicians in exercising the impor-
tant economic choices for patients is not a particularly desirable condi-
tion. The physician may have conflicting economic interests in selecting
procedures, and his lack of incentive to economize doubtless contrib-
utes to the high rate of inflation in the field of health care. But, as Peter
Schuck has pointed out, this dominance of the physician cannot effec-
tively be modified if the patient is left in ignorance. 2 In other words,
the situation is not likely to be greatly ameliorated in the absence of
advertising to inform the consumer's choice.
The Supreme Court has supplied some guidance for the protection
of commercial speech in the field of medical services. In Bigelow v.
Virginia5 3 the Court held that an advertisement for an abortion referral
service was protected by the first amendment because it conveyed in-
formation of interest to members of the public-both those who needed
the services and those who might have a more general interest in the
subject matter. It is true that the interest of the public was enhanced by
the fact that the service offered was one which itself had acquired in-
dependent constitutional protection, 4 but the Court nevertheless noted
its agreement with the proposition that "this is 'a First Amendment
case' and 'not an abortion case.' , The decision certainly buttresses
the view that sufficient public interest underlies medical advertising to
bring it within constitutional protection. Restraints upon such advertis-
ing will therefore have to be justified by some first amendment test ap-
propriate to commercial speech.
One highly interesting facet of the commercial speech decisions is
that they have largely avoided articulating a standard of review. Under
traditional first amendment doctrine, an exercise of the police power is
50. MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, BARRISTERS' SERVICES: A REPORT ON THE
SUPPLY OF BARRISTERS' SERVICES IN RELATION TO RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING 22-24 (1976).
51. HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 1975-76
5, 21-23 (17th ed. 1976).
52. Schuck, supra note 46.
53. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
54. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. 421 U.S. at 815 n.5.
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permitted to infringe speech only where necessary to serve a compel-
ling governmental interest. 6 Included in the concept of "necessary" is
the lack of any less drastic means of accomplishing the legitimate gov-
ernmental objective.5 7 But neither in Bigelow nor in Virginia State
Board ofPharmacy did the Supreme Court specifically embrace this or,
indeed, any other standard of review. It simply engaged in a weighing
process between the public interest supporting advertising and the prof-
fered interests in suppressing it.
The Bates decision adds little doctrinal enlightenment. It does
seem clear from the actual disposition of Bates, however, that a highly
important governmental interest is required to justify a restraint on ad-
vertising. This may well not amount to the traditional "compelling
state interest,"58 but it is certainly a far more stringent requirement
than a mere rational basis for the restraint. In rejecting the arguments
advanced by the bar association for the suppression of advertising, the
Court did not characterize any of them as irrational; it simply disagreed
with the force of the arguments and stated that none of them rose "to
the level of an acceptable reason for the suppression of all advertising
by attorneys."59 The Bates opinion is most instructive, however, in ana-
lyzing the specific advertisement in question and finding it to be pro-
tected. The Court believed that the public would readily understand
the meaning of "legal clinic," and it rejected the argument that it was
deceptive for the advertisement not to state that an attorney was unnec-
essary for a name change.60 With regard to the latter point, the Court
stated:
The record does not unambiguously reveal some of the relevant facts
in determining whether the nondisclosure is misleading, such as how
complicated the procedure is and whether the State provides assist-
ance for laymen ....
We conclude that it has not been demonstrated that the adver-
tisement at issue could be suppressed.61
This formulation from Bates suggests two points. First, a mere ten-
dency or possibility of harm is not sufficient to permit suppression; the
harm must be demonstrated. Second, the burden is on the regulatory
authority to make the required showing.
56. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963) ("The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest
.. . can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms").
57. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62-64
(1960).
58. See general NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
59. 433 U.S. at 379.
60. Id. at 381.
61. Id. at 382.
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The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on commercial speech
may weaken somewhat these conclusions from Bates. In Ohralick v.
Ohio State Bar Association,62 the Court upheld Ohio's ban on in-person
commercial solicitation, holding that the practice presented sufficient
likelihood of defeating a "legitimate and important state interest" 63 in
avoiding fraud and overreaching so that it could be prohibited without
the necessity of showing harm in each individual case. The Court also
made it clear, by both word64 and deed,65 that commercial speech en-
joyed a lower level of protection than political speech. There was no
explicit indication, however, that the Court intended its treatment of
the egregious solicitation involved in Ohralick 66 to carry over to the
field of pure advertising. The Ohralick decision probably cannot be
read as casting doubt on the continued applicability of the Bates-type
weighing process in cases of commercial advertising. When this ap-
proach is applied to the medical field, then, the question remains
whether those seeking to suppress physician advertising can assert spe-
cific interests sufficient under Bates to justify a general prohibition.
D. Asserted Justffcations for Suppression of Physician Advertising.
1. Inherent Deception. The Court in Bates adhered to its earlier
pronouncements that false and deceptive advertising may be prohib-
ited,6 7 but it rejected the argument that fee advertising was so inher-
ently misleading that it should be entirely banned.68 The rejected
contention perhaps has more force in the case of physicians' fee adver-
tising. Arguably, physicians' services are typically more varied than are
those of attorneys and the public is even less able to evaluate and com-
pare the services being offered.
Interestingly enough, this argument and its refutation may be
found in the Bates record, where a neurosurgeon who was chairman of
the professional committee of the county medical society, testifying in
defense of the prohibition, said that it would be ludicrous to advertise
that craniotomies would be performed for a set fee because there were
62. 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978).
63. Id at 1922.
64. Id at 1922 n.20.
65. In a contemporaneous case, In re Primus, 98 S. Ct. 1925 (1978), the Court held unconsti-
tutional the application of a ban against solicitation to an American Civil Liberties Union attor-
ney soliciting a civil liberties case, where no attorney would be paid for services rendered.
66. Ohralick had solicited accident victims, including one who was still hospitalized and in
traction, and had concealed a tape recorder on his person to prevent one of the victims from
denying her oral agreement to engage him. 98 S. Ct. at 1915-16.
67. 433 U.S. at 383.
68. Id. at 378-79.
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over 100 types of craniotomies with infinitely complex variations.6 9 He
also testified that it would not be possible to advertise the treatment of
sore throats for $26.50 because there was infinite variety in the treat-
ment of sore throats.7" Yet the same physician stated that it might be
"possible" to advertise vasectomies for a set fee,7 1 and indicated that
there is considerable uniformity among fees for numerous services be-
cause of the use of relative value scales which govern payment of physi-
cians' fees by insurance companies.72 He further testified that even
within the individual physician's office, the bookkeeper is often given a
schedule of fees for specific treatments, examinations or tests, and the
physician merely checks which ones were given so that the appropriate
fees may be written in by the billing bookkeeper.73 In short, several of
the physician's services are so standardized that fixed fees are easily set
for them. The point from the Bates opinion then becomes applicable:
these standardized services are the ones that are likely to be advertised
for set fees, and a ban of all fee advertising is therefore unjustified.74
The craniotomy would not be advertised for a fixed fee anyway. More
importantly, even if it were, there would still be no deception if the
physician performed an appropriate and needed craniotomy at the ad-
vertised fee.
It may well be true that the prospective patient is often not able to
determine in advance what kinds of services he needs. But the fact that
his intestinal pain may be due to gas or an infected appendix does not
mean that it is useless for him to know what various physicians charge
for appendectomies and which physicians perform them. The same
may be said more strongly for a host of services, from abortions to
electrocardiograms. Since consumers are still permitted to select their
own initial physicians, some information is better than none, as the
Bates Court suggested.75 The mere danger of deception in some cases
does not justify a prohibition of all advertising.
2. Decline in Quality of Services. A similar argument is that the
advertising of set fees would lead to a decline in the quality of services.
Theoretically, the physician who has advertised a set fee would be
tempted to neglect procedures that may be indicated but that would
69. Brief for the AMA, supra note 25, Joint Appendix 313-15.
70. Id. 315-26.
71. Id. 325-26.
72. Id. 334-36.
73. Id. 339-41.
74. 433 U.S. at 378-79.
75. Id. at 374.
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cause the cost to exceed the fee.76 The answer to this argument is no
different for the medical profession than for the legal one: the profes-
sional who is inclined to cut quality in order to increase profit will do
so whether or not he advertises. The existence of set fees for insurance
and prepaid plans indicates that such fees are workable and ought to be
consistent with high-quality services. When a particular problem turns
out to be especially complicated, a loss is taken on that case and made
up on others. The advertised fee is set at a level that accounts for the
occasional complicated case.
3. Damage to the Professional Relationship. The complaint that
advertising is demeaning to the dignity of the profession hardly rises to
the level of public policy if the question is simply one of the practi-
tioner's self-image. The argument is therefore usually stated in terms of
a threatened deterioration in the trust relationship between physician
and patient.77 But the lawyer-client relationship is also built on trust,
and the Bates Court had little difficulty concluding that this trust must
be able to withstand the consumer's common knowledge that the pro-
fessional is attempting to make money at his profession.7 The Court's
observation that advertising does not seem to have affected the public's
view of the dignity of bankers or engineers79 also seems convincing. In
order to infringe a physician's freedom of speech, the first amendment
requires a more definite demonstration of harm to the professional re-
lationship than has yet been shown.
4. Costs of Advertising and Enforcement. The final points of-
fered to support a total ban on physician advertising are practical ones
which the Court also rejected in Bates. The first is that advertising will
raise the cost of services to the consumer. As the Court observed, ad-
vertising is at least as likely to lower those costs by its competitive effect
on prices and its aid to new attorneys seeking to enter the field.80 It also
may eliminate some search costs that the consumer bears in the absence
of advertising. The second argument is that the profession is simply
unable to assume the burden of policing deceptive or otherwise im-
proper advertising. The Court's treatment of this problem in Bates is
rather cursory; it was simply assumed that attorneys would not engage
in improper advertising in any substantial numbers."' It is unlikely that
the medical profession provides any more of a demonstrable problem
76. See Brief for the AMA, supra note 25, at 5.
77. See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-72; Brief for the AMA, supra note 25, at 6-7.
78. 433 U.S. at 368-69.
79. Id. at 369-70.
80. Id. at 377-78.
81. Id. at 379.
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in this regard. If policing ultimately becomes a substantial burden to
the profession, it can always consider abandoning the field and leaving
the matter to the agencies that police other false advertising. Admit-
tedly, however, it is doubtful that either the medical profession or the
Supreme Court would be content with such an alternative. In any
event, problems of enforcement do not presently justify a total ban on
physician advertising.
It thus seems highly improbable that the medical profession will
be able to demonstrate the type of systematic and virtually inevitable
harm from advertising that would justify a total prohibition. The ques-
tions that remain, then, concern the degree of regulation short of prohi-
bition that may be permissible under the first amendment. The answers
depend both upon what Bates held and what its unresolved issues por-
tend.
E. Permissible Regulation of Advertising Under the First Amendment.
1. Overbreadth. The Supreme Court has typically permitted a
litigant to attack a regulation of speech on the ground that some of its
potential applications would restrict the first amendment rights of
others, even though the particular expression of the litigant in question
constitutionally could have been prohibited.82 This type of attack is
permitted because of the danger that an overly broad regulation by its
mere existence would chill the protected expression of some persons
who were uncertain whether their speech was protected and who
lacked the means or determination to contest the regulation directly.8 3
In an exhaustive and largely gratuitous discussion in Bigelow, the
Court indicated that overbreadth attacks could be made against regula-
tions of commercial speech. 4 Nevertheless, the Bates Court refused to
apply the overbreadth doctrine to professional advertising, on grounds
that would seem equally applicable to all product and service advertis-
ing. 85
The Court's reasons for rejecting overbreadth are twofold. First,
the economic incentives behind commercial speech are such that it is
less likely to be chilled than is pure speech.86 Second, commercial ad-
vertisers possess the facts concerning their products or services and are
82. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972); e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
616 (1971).
83. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816 (1975). See generally Note, The First Amendment
Operbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAtv. L. REv. 844 (1970).
84. 421 U.S. at 815-18.
85. 433 U.S. at 380-81.
86. Id. at 381.
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in a better position than others to determine whether their advertising
is true and therefore protected. 7 Both propositions are questionable in
the case of attorneys and almost certainly wrong if applied to physi-
cians. The severe effects of expulsion from a medical society and the
reputational damage that may result from even a successful defense of
an ethical charge are more than sufficient to provide a substantial chill.
The truth or falsity of an advertisement may be a simple matter for the
advertiser to determine if the question is one of price charged for a
standardized service; it is not so easy if the issue is whether there is
sufficient disclosure to protect the consumer from being misled con-
cerning the necessity for treatment.
It seems unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court will modify its
ruling regarding overbreadth. It adhered to its existing position in
Ohralick.8s The Court has become increasingly hostile to the doctrine
even in more typical first amendment cases89 and has an understanda-
ble preference for deciding only the issues presented on the record of
each case. It is not surprising that in scaling down the normal first
amendment protections to fit what it considers the lesser category of
commercial speech, the Court chose overbreadth as one of the first
things to go. As a result, the boundaries of permissible regulation of
physician and lawyer advertising will be hammered out over an ex-
tended period of time, case by case and issue by issue.
2. False or Misleading Advertisements. Political speech cannot
be banned on the ground that it is false; it is up to the listener to make
up his own mind as to what constitutes political truth. Too much
speech would be chilled if political speakers had to guess at what some
future jury might determine to be false.90
In extending the protection of the first amendment to commercial
speech, however, the Supreme Court has assumed from the beginning
that false advertising could continue to be prohibited.9' The reasons are
the same as those offered by the Bates Court in refusing to allow third
parties to attack restraints on professional advertising on grounds of
overbreadth: commercial speech is thought less subject to the chilling
effect and whether the advertisement is truthful is thought to be easily
ascertainable by the advertiser.92 As already stated, these propositions
87. Id
88. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra for a discussion of the case.
89. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
90. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 339-41 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
91. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
92. 433 U.S. at 383; Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
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are far from self-evident. Only recently, an advertisement for acupunc-
ture might well have been condemned as false advertising in the United
States. An argument can be made for letting the consumer decide the
truth or falsity of at least some medical advertising. On the other hand,
much objective advertising is easily subject to factual proof or disproof
and an advertiser should arguably have a duty to verify his statements
before publishing them. In any event, it is clear as a practical matter
that false and misleading advertising will continue to be subject to pro-
hibition.
The difficulties of enforcement lie in fixing standards for mislead-
ing or deceptive advertisements. The Court in Bates suggested that be-
cause the public lacked sophistication with regard to legal services,
"misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in
other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertis-
ing."93 The Court indicated that some form of disclaimer might prop-
erly be required even in connection with the Bates advertisement. 94
Certainly the same admonitions could be applied to physician advertis-
ing. There can be little disagreement with regulations condemning ad-
vertisements which create unjustified expectations, as with a "sure
cure" for many illnesses.95
There is a danger, however, that too stringent a standard may be
applied if the underlying first amendment considerations are not kept
firmly in mind. Virtually any advertisement is capable of misleading
someone, and virtually any advertisement can be made less misleading
by the addition of numerous and detailed disclaimers. Advertisements
by their very nature simplify, and all simplification contains an element
of potential deception. The important point for the regulating body to
keep in mind is that the protection of commercial speech is based upon
a balancing process. An advertisement should not be condemned per se
merely because it is capable of deceiving someone. That is but one side
of the scale; it may or may not outweigh the interest of other individu-
als in receiving the information contained in the advertisement-an in-
terest that must be thrown into the balance as well. Also to be
considered are the ease with which the misleading tendency can be
avoided and the degree to which elimination of the misleading portion
or punishment for publication may chill the dissemination of informa-
tion. In short, the regulatory body must give some weight to the new
element that has been injected into the law of false advertising-the
93. 433 U.S. at 383.
94. Id. at 384.
95. Such advertising has already been condemned by the AMA. Statement of the Judicial
Council Re.Advertising and Solicitation, supra note 27, at 2328.
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first amendment interest in the dissemination of information. 96 The
Supreme Court's own performance in protecting the advertisement in
Bates is an appropriate model; the advertisement could have been
made less misleading by a statement that an attorney is not essential for
a name change and by a precise and detailed description of what was
meant by "legal clinic." Neither disclaimer was required, at least in the
absence of a much stronger showing of need. The Court is likely to
show the same tolerance if it is called upon to deal with physician ad-
vertising.
3. Advertisement of Quality of Services. The Bates Court did
not determine the permissibility of advertisements of quality of serv-
ices, with the caveat that such claims are not susceptible of verification
and thus may be so misleading as to warrant restriction.97 While the
Court's language suggests sympathy toward a prohibition, there are
many varieties of advertisements of quality, and some of them should
be protected. Puffing of the "best physician in town" variety is most
likely what the Court had in mind as a candidate for prohibition. But
an advertisement stating that a physician has been in practice a certain
number of years, that he is certified in a specialty and that he graduated
from a prestigious medical school is certainly an advertisement that
suggests a high quality of services; the information has little other use.
The advertisement is by almost any definition "self-laudatory."9 Yet it
conveys precisely the kind of information that a consumer of medical
services is entitled to know. Thus first amendment standards will not be
met by a regulation which prohibits all advertisement suggesting a high
quality of service or containing self-laudatory material. If the objective
statements are reasonably subject to verification, implications of quali-
ty should be permissible.
One variety of advertisement implying quality that is specifically
disapproved by the new AMA standards is the testimonial.99 It is ar-
96. For recent cases that wrestle with first amendment commercial speech doctrines in the
FrC false advertising context, see Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
919 (1976).
97. 433 U.S. at 383-84.
98. The Statement of the Judicial Council of the AMA condemns as "solicitation" attempts
to obtain patients with statements that "are self-laudatory and imply that the physician has skills
superior to other physicians engaged in his field or specialty of practice." Statement of the Judicial
CouncilRe: Advertising and Solicitation, supra note 27, at 2328. The ethical considerations recom-
mended by the ABA after the Bates decision include the comment that "self-laudation should be
avoided." ABA Proposal on Lawyer Advertising (Proposal A), EC 2-8 (1977).
99. The testimonial is condemned by the AMA as another form of solicitation. Statement of
the Judicial Council Re: Advertising and Solicitation, supra note 27, at 2328.
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gued that a person might quite honestly state that "Dr. Jones cured my
problem in six weeks," but the cure may not be attributable to anything
done by Dr. Jones; furthermore, the fact that Dr. Jones cured one per-
son in six weeks is irrelevant to what he can do for another person. o
The argument has considerable surface plausibility. Its difficulty is that
the traditional way of choosing doctors, favored by those who would
limit advertising, is for the potential consumer to ask friends and neigh-
bors for a physician who has given them satisfactory service; that is, to
solicit just such testimonials. To be sure, it might be preferable for the
consumer to seek recommendations of quality from physicians about
other physicians (assuming candor would survive professional cour-
tesy), but most consumers do not have access to that kind of opinion.
Since the lay person's testimonial is the next most satisfactory selection
tool, it is not readily apparent why an advertised testimonial might not
be equally useful. Perhaps it is feared that the economic motive would
create a temptation to give false testimonials and that testimonials se-
lected by the provider would likely present an unbalanced picture.
On its face, one may also question the assertion that the success of
one cure is not relevant to the potential success of others. The defi-
ciency of the typical testimonial is not lack of relevance but insuffi-
ciency of sample. One hundred consecutive appendectomies without a
complication would certainly not be irrelevant to the likelihood of a
hundred-and-first. Moreover, it is more consistent with the first amend-
ment theory of commercial speech for the regulators to concern them-
selves with truth in advertising and to permit the consumers to be the
judge of relevance. If that approach is not always practicable in the
field of medicine, it is nevertheless a reasonable goal in the common
run of cases.
Comparative advertising is a subspecies of advertisement of quali-
ty that is also condemned by the new AMA rules. Here again, the con-
demnation is too restrictive; the AMA would condemn statements that
are "self-laudatory and imply that the physician has skills superior to
other physicians engaged in his field or specialty of practice."'' Such a
restraint is probably reasonable as applied to the "best physician in
town" advertisement, but not to the advertisement (admittedly a rarity)
which states that a physician has twenty-five years of practice while the
other physician in town has only two. The latter information may be
distasteful to the second physician but it contains information that
would almost certainly be relevant to the selection of a physician either
100. Brief for the AMA, supra note 25, at 6.
101. Statement of the Judicial CouncilRe:Adertising and Solicitation, supra note 27, at 2328.
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by a lay person or by a fellow physician. The admonition of the Bates
Court that some information is better than none would seem to apply.
If the information is sufficiently factual to be subject to verification, it
should be protected despite reasonable implications of quality that
might be drawn from it.
4. Radio and Television Advertising. The Court in Bates simply
stated that "the special problems of advertising on the electronic broad-
cast media will warrant special consideration."' 2 It is difficult to see,
however, how the two characteristics of the electronic media thought to
have the most significance for purposes of the first amendment-the
limitation of spectrum space and the greater impact of the me-
dia M3-have any particular relevance to the reasoning of the Bates
Court. Indeed, radio and television have a much greater potential than
print for reaching the audience least likely to have knowledge of or
access to attorneys or physicians. This consideration led the ABA to
recommend that radio advertising be permitted,1°4 and the case for ra-
dio advertisement by physicians seems equally strong.
Television advertising was not recommended by the ABA; it was
suggested that the state regulatory bodies permit such advertising only
upon a special showing that the public interest would be served by it. 0 5
Television was thought to present special problems of emphasizing
style over substance, excessive cost and difficulty of monitoring. The
latter two objections can be quickly dismissed. Television advertising is
likely to be utilized only to the extent that it represents a reasonable
cost per viewer compared with other methods of advertising. Monitor-
ing can be managed by requiring advertisers to keep tapes or tran-
scripts of commercials. The question of style is more complex, but
ought not to be regarded as a justification for banning television adver-
tising. The problem, once again, is determining who may decide what
is ;relevant for purposes of choosing lawyers or physicians. Admittedly,
television conveys an image of the person who appears on it, so that a
potential patient might decide that he likes the physician's appearance,
voice or attitude. The organized profession may well feel, as the ABA
does, that such considerations are irrelevant to the choice of a profes-
sional and that this information therefore should not be made available
to consumers. But a strong first amendment argument can be made to
102. 433 U.S. at 384.
103. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969); Banzhaf v. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
104. ABA Proposal on Lawyer Advertising (Proposal A) (1977), excerpted, 63 A.B.A.J. 1234
(1977).
105. Id. 1235. Proposal B, which was not adopted, contains a similar provision. Id 1236.
[Vol. 1978:543
PHYSICIAN AD VERTISING
the contrary: to a person seeking to enter a professional relationship of
confidence and trust it is highly relevant whether he is at ease in the
presence of his doctor or lawyer. Indeed, a lay person who is ac-
quainted personally with physicians whom he deems to be competent
may well select the one he thinks has the best bedside manner. That
consideration may be quite relevant to the effectiveness of the profes-
sional relationship. The best approach under the first amendment
would be to leave the question of style to the consumer; some may like
flamboyance and some conservatism. There is no legitimate reason why
they should be deprived of the choice by a regulating body. A total ban
of television advertising is certainly more than is necessary to control
such an evil, even assuming that it is indeed an evil.
5. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions. The Supreme Court
has indicated that professional advertising, like other speech, may be
subject to reasonable restrictions regarding time, place and manner. °6
This issue is likely to arise in two situations. First, methods of advertis-
ing thought to be lacking in dignity or restraint would probably be sub-
ject to sanction, but with dubious propriety. A neon sign might not
seem particularly dignified, but that fact alone does not justify a prohi-
bition. Dignity relates to content, not manner. If the neon sign is also a
traffic hazard, that is an entirely different manner, but such restrictions
hardly need be addressed especially to professional advertising.
A second problem of time, place or manner restriction arises in the
case of advertisement or solicitation of accident victims at the time and
place of the accident or immediately thereafter. It was in such a setting
that the Supreme Court upheld a ban upon in-person solicitation by
lawyers. 7 On the other hand, the dangers are undoubtedly less severe
in the case of doctors than of lawyers. If the emergency is a true one
and a physician appears on the scene, his immediate employment will
almost certainly be considered a benefit by all concerned. If more per-
manent employment is solicited, it would be reasonable for a regulating
body to impose some restrictions designed to insure that persons not be
importuned at a time when their physical distress is likely to deprive
them of the faculty of rational choice.
Other limitations of time, place and manner may suggest them-
selves as the Court further adjudicates the boundaries of permissible
regulation. It seems clear, however, that here as elsewhere the first
amendment considerations ruled upon or hinted at in Bates preclude
generalized prohibitions based upon professional traditions. Bates has
106. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
107. See note 66 supra and text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
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tipped the constitutional scales in favor of the dissemination of infor-
mation about physicians' services and fees, and that fact will permeate
future decisions on the regulation of advertising. The remaining issues
are the degree to which the antitrust laws may apply to the subject of
physician advertising and the differing considerations they may intro-
duce.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO PHYSICIAN
ADVERTISING
The antitrust challenge to prohibitions against lawyer advertising
in Bates foundered because the disciplinary rule was held to be an af-
firmative command of the state.108 The rule was required by the state
supreme court and, therefore, that court was the real party in interest.
Under this characterization, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal
antitrust laws could not be applied since they were not intended by
Congress to preempt state action.109 Consequently, the Court did not
have to determine whether Arizona's total ban of price advertising by
lawyers was a per se violation of the Sherman Act or whether it should
be tested under the rule of reason evaluating the impact of the prohibi-
tion on the market for lawyers' services.
Two factors may justify a substantially different approach to re-
strictions on physician advertising. First, as already noted,110 no clear-
cut judicial or other state command underlies many restrictions on phy-
sician advertising. Thus, the question whether the federal antitrust laws
apply to such advertising proscriptions presents more complex and so-
phisticated issues. Second, if the antitrust laws generally do apply to
restrictions on physician advertising, it is far from clear that all such
restrictions (including prohibitions of price advertising) would violate
the Sherman Act. Indeed, persuasive arguments can be made that these
advertising restrictions should be tested in accordance with a rule of
reason approach.
A. Jurisdictional Issues.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 1 the Supreme Court held that a
state bar association's enforcement of a minimum fee schedule pub-
lished by a county bar association amounted to price fixing and there-
fore violated the Sherman Act. Prior to this 1975 ruling, most
108. 433 U.S. at 361.
109. Id at 359-63.
110. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
111. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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professionals and professional associations assumed that they were
outside the target area of antitrust liability. Few complaints had been
brought against lawyers, physicians, engineers or architects by either
government agencies or private parties. And in most instances the ac-
tions of professionals were not even reviewed because the courts quick-
ly dismissed such lawsuits."1 '
The reason for the absence of antitrust action against medical soci-
eties or other professional groups or individuals is that the claimant
had to overcome three basic hurdles before the substantive complaint
could be heard. First, the claimant had to show that the defendants'
activity substantially affected interstate or foreign commerce. Second,
the claimant's action was barred entirely if the defendants were partici-
pants in a learned profession exempt from the antitrust laws. Third, the
claimant had to ascertain whether the particular actions being chal-
lenged were mandated or supervised by state agencies and were there-
fore within the state action limitation on the antitrust laws. For a long
time these barriers to an antitrust complaint seemed insurmountable.
Today only the last remains effective and its application as a bar to
such actions has been reduced.
1. Interstate Commerce. The first hurdle, that interstate com-
merce must be affected before the antitrust laws can be invoked, fol-
lows from the language of the Sherman Act focusing on restraints or
monopolization of "trade or commerce among the several states." 113 It
is, moreover, a constitutional requirement since Congress can regulate
only where the activity affected is within or has a significant effect on
the flow of interstate commerce.11 4 The issue, then, is whether the pro-
fessional service being challenged-for example, the refusal of a medi-
cal society to approve physician advertising of prices-is essentially
local in nature. If viewed as a local service, the restraint on the physi-
cian's services usually will not be held to have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. In most situations a physician's treatment of pa-
tients is localized and is neither in interstate commerce nor likely to
affect it in any substantial respect. That, at least, was the argument par-
alleled by the county bar association in Goldfarb when minimum fee
schedules for title searches were under attack. The Supreme Court did
. 112. Eg., Rigell v. Washington County Medical Soe'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 954 (1958); 0f Estate of Freeman v. Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336, 311
N.E.2d 480 (1974) (practice of law is a profession rather than a business and minimum fee sched-
ule of county bar association therefore not subject to state antitrust law).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
114. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944) (Sher-
man Act interpreted as going "to the utmost extent of [Congress'] Constitutional power.").
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not accept this contention, however, because the title searches were
found to be intimately related to and, indeed, inseparable from mort-
gage loans frequently guaranteed by the federal government. Thus,
minimum title search fees did in fact substantially affect interstate com-
merce.
11 5
For a time, albeit briefly, it could have been argued that only those
professions intimately related to general business activity-for exam-
ple, law, engineering and architecture-were subject to this interpreta-
tion and that other professions less clearly related to commercial
activity-primarily medicine and dentistry-might still be protected
because of the Court's emphasis on "the substantial volume of com-
merce involved."1" 6 However, in 1976 in Hospital Building Co. v. Trust-
ees of Rex Hospital,"7 the Court clearly established that it would read
antitrust complaints liberally in order to find the necessary nexus be-
tween the challenged conduct and interstate commerce.' 8 In that case,
one hospital's effort to block the relocation and expansion of another
hospital, all within the city limits of Raleigh, North Carolina, was held
to have placed an "unreasonable burden on the free and uninterrupted
flow" of commerce because these activities could affect purchases of
out-of-state medicines and insurance as well as payments to out-of-
state managers and lenders." 9 Under this line of reasoning, any re-
straint on physician services, including advertising prohibitions, would
seem to have the requisite effect on commerce. Therefore, the require-
ment that restraints on physician services affect interstate commerce
does not generally bar application of the antitrust laws to their activi-
ties.' 20
2. Learned Professions. The second impediment to an antitrust
complaint against physicians or lawyers had been the argument that
they are members of learned professions which are not within the
"trade or commerce" language of the Sherman Act. In other words, it
was argued that the professions were service- rather than profit-ori-
ented and thus were not business activities intended by Congress to be
within the purview of the antitrust laws. The ethical canons of these
professions nobly state that money-making is not their aim; rather, it is
the duty of every doctor and lawyer to provide necessary services to the
115. Goidfarb, 421 U.S. at 783-85.
116. Id. at 785.
117. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
118. Id. at 742 n.1.
119. Id. at 746.
120. Accord, Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
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community.' 2 1
This primary service goal of lawyers, physicians and similar pro-
fessions has been the traditional basis for distinguishing professions
from trades or business in other areas. This distinction has been recog-
nized in occasional language in judicial opinions, as in the Supreme
Court's statement that "medical practitioners. . . follow a profession
and not a trade."' 22 Thus, the learned profession exemption seemed to
be the most promising defense available when local bar association
rules were first challenged on antitrust grounds in Goldfarb. But the
argument that lawyers were not profit-oriented lost much of its force
when relied upon to save a minimum fee schedule, since the schedule
was obviously designed to eliminate price competition and to increase
profits. It became a simple matter for the Court to conclude that title
examinations were services provided by lawyers in exchange for money
and that their activities were "commerce" under the Sherman Act. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[i]t is no disparagement of the practice of law as
a profession to acknowledge that it has this business aspect."'' 2 3
While an effort might still be made to distinguish physician serv-
ices from legal services, such efforts seem doomed. Even accepting
without question the altruistic motives and public service notions com-
monly attributed by physicians to their own efforts, it cannot be denied
that profit is more than an incidental by-product of the medical profes-
sion. Fee schedules, as well as relative value scales, are not unknown to
doctors. If there were any question as to this conclusion, it was dis-
pelled by the Court's recent rejection under the first amendment of the
bar's argument in Bates that price advertising would commercialize the
practice of law and undermine the professionalism of the bar. Describ-
ing this argument as simple-minded self-deception, the Court noted
that it incorrectly "presumes that attorneys must conceal from them-
selves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their
livelihood at the bar."' 24 The Court's dismissal of the contention that
lawyers are somehow not involved in a commercial trade and are
"above it all" seems to foreclose further reliance on the argument that
the medical profession can join professional baseball 125 in a privileged
121. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 786-88.
122. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931). See cases cited in Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at
786 n.15.
123. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788.
124. 433 U.S. at 368.
125. See Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) (organized
baseball held not to be commerce); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (baseball's exemption
continued on grounds of stare decisis). But 5f Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S.
445 (1957) (professional football held to be commerce subject to antitrust laws).
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sanctuary untouched by the antitrust laws.
3. State Action-the Parker Doctrine. The third argument that
has been offered to protect professional services and their regulation
from antitrust scrutiny, the "state action" doctrine, is different from the
first two jurisdictional defenses in that it retains vitality and is the
center of continuing dispute. Based upon a 1943 decision, Parker v.
Brown,26 the doctrine provides that the Sherman Act was intended by
Congress to regulate only private practices restraining trade. The
Parker Court determined that state legislatures were not prevented by
the federal antitrust laws from regulating market practices within their
states. For this exemption from the Sherman Act to apply, the competi-
tive restraint must be imposed as a governmental action. Thus, the
Parker Court upheld, against an antitrust challenge, a California pro-
gram regulating the marketing of raisins which denied producers free
access to potential buyers of their crops.' 27 Even though private indi-
viduals have engaged in price fixing or other anticompetitive conduct,
their actions will be attributed to the state and exempted from antitrust
liability if they are mandated and supervised by a state agency.' 28
Parker held that the antitrust laws did not prevent the states from sub-
stituting economic regulation for the free market preference of the
Sherman Act. 129
This rule was ostensibly based upon Congress' intent in adopting
the Sherman Act.'30 Although the Court was undoubtedly accurate
when it said that nothing in the Act or its history supported a conclu-
sion that the purpose was to restrain state action, similar reasoning
starting from a polar premise could have suggested a contrary conclu-
sion. Under such an analysis, the policy of the Sherman Act would be
interpreted as preventing states from permitting or requiring, directly
or indirectly, anticompetitive conduct such as price fixing; nothing in
the legislative history exempted state action. This was, indeed, the posi-
tion of the Justice Department, which filed a brief asserting that the
126. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
127. In fact, Parker involved neither a direct governmental action nor a Sherman Act suit.
The plaintiff had filed an equitable complaint seeking to enjoin state officers from enforcing the
state raisin program, in part because it contravened the policies and requirements of the Sherman
Act. When the Court ruled that the Sherman Act had not been violated, the equitable action
failed.
128. 317 U.S. at 352.
129. Id at 350-51.
130. "The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was
intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." Id. at 351.
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state program was inconsistent with the Sherman Act13 1 (though not
with federal agricultural legislation). The Parker doctrine was un-
doubtedly meant to be an accommodation to state interests in occupa-
tional licensure and other market regulation programs which had
previously been invalidated under the discredited line of cases which
used substantive due process as a method for overturning numerous
efforts at government regulation. 132
Applied to the professions, the state action exemption arguably
protects regulation carried out under the auspices of a state agency or
court or through an "integrated" (mandatory) association, as in the
case of lawyers, or possibly by state boards of accountancy or medical
examiners, as is the rule for other professional regulation.1 33 On the
other hand, the Parker doctrine specifically relied on the fact that the
state's program "derived its authority from the legislative command of
the state and was not intended to operate or become effective without
that command."' 34 That underlying command seems absent in much
professional regulation where canons of professional ethics are drafted.
In medicine, for example, the canons are written by the AMA and
often enforced by local private medical societies, hospitals and, indi-
rectly, by malpractice insurers. Moreover, Parker itself states two limi-
131. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 53-59, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943).
132. For a careful examination of this thesis, see Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and
Antitrust: Reylections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLuM. L. Rav. 328 (1975). See also Handler, The
Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1976). We
disagree, however, with the analyses and conclusions offered by both Verkuil and Handler. See
note 206 infra.
133. The role of the state bar associations in enforcing ethical restraints is partially depen-
dent upon the legal structure of the particular association and its relation to the courts of the state.
In some states the bar association is a voluntary private organization and membership is not a
prerequisite for the practice of law. Such voluntary associations normally have committees that
issue opinions on questions of ethics. These opinions and other positions taken by the association
may have a persuasive effect on the courts, but the connection remains unofficial, and the actual
disciplinary enforcement lies with the judiciary. A different and increasingly prevalent pattern for
bar associations, however, is that of the "integrated" state bar such as that involved in Bates. The
State Bar of Arizona is established by statute, Apiz. REV. STAT. § 32-231 (1976), and court rule,
ARIz. Sup. CT. R. 27. Membership in the bar is a requirement for the practice of law, Aiz. REv.
STAT. § 32-261 (1976); Aiz. Sup. CT. R. 27(a)(3). Investigation and prosecution of ethical viola-
tions are in the hands of the State Bar, and initial disciplinary hearings are conducted before one
of its committees. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 32-269 (1976); ARIZ. Sup. CT. R. 32-35. Fully contested
cases are ultimately reviewed by the state supreme court, which has the sole power to impose
suspension or disbarment. AIuz. Sup. CT. R. 36-37.
134. 317 U.S. at 350. Immunity is conferred only when the anticompetitive policy is man-
dated by the state; the actions of a municipality are not immune in the absence of such a state
policy. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978). See generally
Note, Antitrust Laws and Municopal Corporations: Are Municipaities Exempt from Sherman Act
Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 Gao. L.J. 1547 (1977).
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tations on its holding. First, a state cannot immunize private action
merely by authorizing private individuals to violate the Sherman
Act; 1 35 the state must both organize and enforce the program. Second,
Parker did not involve a situation where the state was "a participant in
a private agreement" to restrain trade. 136 These two exceptions as well
as the inherent ambiguities in Parker have become prominent in recent
Supreme Court decisions. One must look to these cases for guidance in
determining whether legal constraints on physician advertising would
now be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
Goldfarb was the first of a trio of major Court cases in this area . 37
The issue in that case was whether a minimum fee schedule applicable
to all lawyers violated the Sherman Act. The schedule had been drawn
up by a voluntary county bar association and its enforcement was the
responsibility of the mandatory state bar association.' 38 Although the
schedule had in fact never been formally enforced in a disciplinary ac-
tion, the plaintiffs had been unable to find a lawyer willing to charge
less, despite an extensive search;' 39 the state bar had published reports
and opinions supporting fee schedules and in one such opinion had
ruled that an attorney who "habitually" charges less than the minimum
is presumed to be guilty of misconduct 4° Notwithstanding that the
state bar association was a state agency by law, it was far from certain
that the state supreme court (which was granted the authority to regu-
late the practice of law and had delegated investigation and enforce-
ment responsibility to the state bar) had in fact required the
anticompetitive activities. The Court concluded:
Respondents' arguments, at most, constitute the contention that their
activities complemented the objective of the ethical codes. In our
view that is not state action for Sherman Act purposes. It is not
enough that, as the County Bar puts it, anticompetitive conduct is
"prompted" by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be
compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.141
The Court held that the fee schedule was "essentially a private an-
ticompetitive activity" unprotected by the Parker doctrine. 14
2
Nevertheless, the Court's ruling late in the next term that Vir-
ginia's statute forbidding the advertising of prescription drugs infringed
135. 317 U.S. at 351; see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386-
87, 389 (1951); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47 (1904).
136. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
137. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
138. 421 U.S. at 776.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 777-78.
141. Id. at 791.
142. Id. at 791-92.
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the first amendment fights of retail druggists included a comment that
the state action doctrine had not been abandoned: 43 "Virginia is free
to require whatever professional standards it wishes of pharmacists; it
may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other
154ways.' ' 4
Exactly what this statement meant or what was covered by the
Goldfarb test exempting anticompetitive conduct "compelled by direc-
tion of the state" was the subject of extensive discussion by the Court
just six weeks later.145 In Cantor v. Detroit Edison CO., 146 the Court
declined to shield from antitrust attack a public utility's program
whereby new light bulbs were exchanged for burned-out bulbs. In con-
trast to the Court's opinion, the facts in Cantor are simple. For eighty
years, Detroit Edison had distributed light bulbs to its customers with-
out charge "to increase the consumption of electricity.' 47 This ex-
change program had been included in its tariffs filed with the Michigan
state regulatory agency for sixty years. Because the state agency ap-
proved the utility's rate structure and supervised its actions closely, the
lower courts had dismissed the complaint; they viewed the case as be-
ing squarely within the Parker doctrine. 148 When the case came to the
Supreme Court, however, it was equally clear that the lower courts had
not correctly understood the gloss which Goldfarb had added to the
state action rule. This confusion was demonstrated by the Justices
themselves as they divided into four factions with no opinion com-
manding more than four votes. 14 9
In interpreting the opinions in Cantor, two points need to be
noted. First, six of the nine justices found that the state action doctrine
was inapplicable. 50 Those refusing to apply it to the bulb exchange
program relied primarily on the fact that the state had sought to regu-
late only the distribution of electricity, not the marketing of light
143. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
144. Id. at 770.
145. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1976).
146. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
147. Id. at 584.
148. Id. at 581.
149. However, the Chief Justice did join with the plurality in Part III of the opinion which
stated that private conduct required by state law may be exempt from the Sherman Act to the
minimum extent necessary to make the state regulation work. But he could not agree that the
Parker immunity was limited to official action taken by state officers. Id. at 603.
150. Justice Stevens' discussion of the state action question was joined by only Justices Bren-
nan, white and Marshall. Id. at 581. However, both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
wrote concurring opinions. Id at 603, 605.
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bulbs.151 The utility had initiated the exchange program and appar-
ently was free to abandon it upon the filing of a new tariff. Thus, it did
not seem unfair to the Court that the utility should be required to bear
the antitrust consequences of its program. Second, no statement of the
state action doctrine could command a majority of the Supreme Court.
A plurality of four read Parker as being limited to upholding only the
antitrust immunity of official action taken by state officials. 52 Their
opinion did not read the state action doctrine as applying to private
conduct not dominated by the state. Yet this same plurality stated no
corresponding rule and left it wholly unclear what the boundaries of
the doctrine (beyond the Parker minima) might be, if any. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, who concurred in the plurality's conclusion as well as in
much of its opinion, would have reiterated the standard he announced
in Goldfarb, namely that the issue was whether the challenged conduct
was required by the state acting in its governmental capacity. 53 Four
Justices would have looked instead at the congressional intent to ex-
empt or include the private conduct, although this group disagreed
among themselves as to whether Congress intended to preempt state
regulation of private conduct.154
After the Cantor decision, the law appears to be unduly confused.
Indeed one commentator has gone so far as to say that "[a]fter Cantor,
it was anyone's guess whether there was a state action defense and if
there was, what its scope might be."' 55 However, both the Goldfarb and
Cantor decisions appear to presage closer scrutiny by the Court of ef-
forts to immunize private conduct from antitrust liability by masquer-
ading it as state action. The Court clearly seems concerned with private
domination of markets through the use (and abuse) of state agencies.
Thus, where the decision making is in fact controlled by private indi-
viduals or groups, especially in the furtherance of their special interests,
it will not be exempt from the reach of the Sherman Act. The Court
seems to be saying that what individuals cannot do privately, they can-
not do under "cover" of state law.
The Bates opinion reinforced this interpretation of the law. Again,
however, the Court did not announce a standard for determining the
degree of state compulsion required for a finding of state action where
private conduct was involved, undoubtedly because the Justices still
151. Id. at 584-85 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 604-05 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 612-
14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
152. Id at 591, 601-02.
153. Id at 604.
154. Id at 605 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 632 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
155. Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court
Term-1977, 77 CoLuM. L. Rav. 979, 1013 (1977).
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could not agree on the applicable legal standard. On the other hand,
the factors relied upon by the Court are instructive. The antitrust
claims in Bates were viewed as being directed against the state court
even though the state bar was the nominal defendant. The state's inter-
est in regulating advertising was well established; the attorneys chal-
lenging the no-advertising rule had conceded that false or misleading
ads were a legitimate subject of state regulation as against both anti-
trust and first amendment claims. The regulation of lawyer advertising
was actively pursued by the state bar and court. As a result, "concern
that federal policy is being unnecessarily and inappropriately sub-
ordinated to state policy is reduced."' 6
Restating these points as a legal test, whether private conduct sub-
ject to some state control is within the state action exemption now ap-
pears to rest on the answer to three questions. First, is the state the real
party in interest in the lawsuit? Second, does the state have an in-
dependent regulatory interest in the challenged activity? Finally, does
the disputed conduct reflect a clear articulation of state policy rather
than a mere acquiescence by the state in the program? The Court is
obviously reluctant to impinge on state sovereignty. Yet there are limits
to what it will tolerate. Thus, the state action exemption will be applied
only where the state, acting in its governmental capacity, has played a
significant role in the challenged activity. What further evolution the
doctrine will undergo is uncertain.
Before suggesting how the state action doctrine might apply to ad-
vertising restrictions on physician services, a question could be raised
as to whether the matter has not already been answered by our earlier
analysis of the first amendment challenge. It might be argued that if the
state connection to these restraints is sufficient to invoke the fourteenth
amendment,' 57 it is also necessarily sufficient to constitute Parker state
action. However, "state action" as applied to the fourteenth amend-
ment and to the Sherman Act are not synonymous. First, the legal
standards of requisite state action are not at all identical or even simi-
lar. The policy behind the first amendment requires that it be read lib-
erally and applied broadly. Hence, almost any conduct that is coerced
or encouraged by the state is subject to first amendment challenge. The
policy behind the Parker doctrine, on the other hand, seeks to accom-
modate legitimate state interests in protecting its citizens from unde-
sirable conduct while recognizing national policies favoring free and
open competition in most markets.'58 There is, in addition, serious con-
156. 433 U.S. at 362.
157. See notes 30, 33 & 35 supra and text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
158. See 428 U.S. at 596-97.
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cem that state sovereignty be preserved and that the courts not reverse
state regulation merely because of differing economic perceptions.1 59
Consequently, the state action concept in antitrust law applies a much
higher-and as yet, unclear-threshold. And it is not necessarily incon-
sistent to say that conduct which constitutes state action for first
amendment purposes is not within the ambit of the Parker exemption.
Second, different conduct may be at issue. Advertising restraints im-
posed by state boards may fall only before a constitutional challenge
whereas similar prohibitions established by local medical societies or
private hospitals may be subject only to antitrust liability.
As this discussion suggests, the particular facts in each case are
critical in deciding whether rules preventing advertising by physicians
are within the reach of the antitrust laws. The focus of this Article is on
the legal restraints on physician advertising, and therefore we do not
explore in depth all the possible areas where such restraints might exist.
The foundation for the various restraints on advertising, however, ap-
pears to be section 5 of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics, which
provides, in part, that a physician "should not solicit patients."1 60 As
already noted, 61 this canon is still widely read by physicians and local
societies as barring all physician advertising, despite a recent AMA in-
terpretation that physicians may advertise but may not engage in ad-
vertising practices which amount to solicitation of patients by false or
deceptive statements. 162 Even prior to its latest interpretation, the AMA
itself has not been directly enforcing a restraint; in the last thirty-five
years it has never disciplined a member for violation of section 5 of its
ethical principles. In the one section 5 case to reach its Judicial Council,
the Council reversed a state society's holding that a health care group's
advertising violated AMA principles.163
But it also seems clear, from the briefs filed by complaint counsel
and especially by the AMA's counsel in the current FTC litigation, 64
159. The Parker Court made this point clearly:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not
lightly to be attributed to Congress.
317 U.S. at 350-51.
160. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
161. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
162. Statement of the Judicial Council Re.Advertising and Solicitation, supra note 27, at 2328.
163. Matter of Ben E. Landess, AMA Opinions and Reports of Judicial Council (1955).
164. See Briefs, AMA, FTC Dkt. No. 9064, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REp.
(CCH) 1 21,068. See also Briefs, American Dental Ass'n, FTC Dkt. No. 9093, [1977] 3 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) T 21,255.
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as well as from studies by economists and other social scientists, that
numerous examples could be found of national groups (such as the
American College of Emergency Physicians), local medical societies,
and state boards dominated by private physicians, that have in fact
used section 5 to bar advertising which was primarily informative and
not misleading.165 Whether these prohibitions violate the antitrust laws
will be examined later; for now it is enough to conclude that physicians
acting in private groups, primarily through local medical societies, have
sought to bar all advertising.
The significance of such efforts, and the concern they create as a
matter of public policy as well as under specific rules of the Sherman
Act, is that disapproval by a medical society invariably goes far beyond
private expressions of disagreement. Improper advertising may be de-
clared to be unprofessional conduct and may form the basis for expul-
sion of participating physicians from membership in the county
medical society. While licensing violations are usually enforced by state
boards or, in some cases, courts or other government agencies, much of
the disciplinary activity short of censure or revocation of a license is the
responsibility (by default rather than specific delegation) of the local
society. 166 This power is substantial because of the central importance
of membership in this private group. As previously described, 167 expul-
sion can have disastrous consequences for the physician.
Even where the advertising ban is promulgated by a state board, it
is far from clear that sufficient state action will be involved to establish
antitrust immunity. These boards are invariably controlled by physi-
cians and their representatives. For example, in the great majority of
states, license boards
are appointed by the governors from a list of names submitted by the
state medical society. In two states, the state medical society directly
selects the members of the board. In Alabama, the Board of Censors
of the state medical society is the state licensing board as well. Thus,
the state medical societies are accorded a fundamental role in deter-
mining the composition of the state licensing boards.' 68
Enough has been said to support the view that the state action doc-
trine is unlikely to insulate medicine's general ban on advertising from
antitrust challenge. This does not mean that, as currently formulated,
most local societies, state boards or even the AMA would be held to
165. See, e.g., Ryacack, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY (W. Adams ed. 1966); A.
NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 54.
166. A. NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 57.
167. See text accompanying note 26 supra. See also Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1978).
168. A. NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 50.
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have violated the antitrust laws. It does mean that their rulings on phy-
sician advertising are no longer free from outside evaluation.
B. Due Process Limits and Antitrust Princiles.
The fact that ethical rules and other constraints are applied by
medical boards and local societies to restrain physician advertising sug-
gests another issue involving the use of the antitrust laws to enforce
procedural fairness within private organizations. 169 It has long been ob-
served that no one should be the judge of his own cause. Thus, in
Tumey v. Ohio170 the due process clause of the Constitution was held to
have been violated when a community's mayor, acting as judge of the
mayor's court, received a share of the fines he levied against persons
convicted by him. It was too much, the Court said, to expect him, act-
ing in his judicial capacity, always to "hold the balance nice, clear, and
true between the state and the accused."17 1 This requirement of neu-
trality was extended in Ward v. Village of MonroeVille172 where the
mayor again also acted as judge. This time, however, fines and costs
were not shared with the mayor but went into the village's treasury.1 73
These levies produced up to half the village budget and the Court was
worried that the mayor's judgment, when acting as judge, might be af-
fected by the realization that a decline in court revenues would have to
be offset by a decrease in services or an increase in taxes.' 74 The Court
therefore held that the possible temptation to bias was enough to dis-
qualify the mayor from acting as judge, notwithstanding that no profit
went directly to the mayor. 175
This principle was applied to state regulatory agencies policing the
professions in Gibson v. Berryhill 176 In Gibson, corporate employed sal-
aried optometrists sued in federal court to restrain disciplinary pro-
ceedings brought against them by the Alabama Board of Optometry, a
169. A related enforcement issue stems from the Noerr-Ptenningion doctrine. Evolving from
the cases of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), and UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the doctrine protects concerted campaigns
to petition or influence governmental action from Sherman Act challenges. Efforts by bar associa-
tions and medical societies seeking to persuade legislatures to adopt regulatory rules restricting
competition clearly raise Noerr-Penninglon problems. The case law appears to allow wide latitude
to such efforts unless the concerted conduct involves blatantly unlawful efforts at persuasion. See
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
170. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
171. Id. at 532.
172. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
173. Id. at 58.
174. Id. at 60.
175. Id. This holding was not affected by the availability of a trial de novo before an impar-
tial tribunal whenever a dissatisfied defendant appealed from the mayor's court. Id at 61-62.
176. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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state regulatory body whose members were all engaged in private prac-
tice.177 The Supreme Court held that state board proceedings would
have violated the plaintiffs' right to due process because the optometrist
members of the board were in financial competition with those being
disciplined: "It is sufficiently clear from our cases that those with sub-
stantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate
these disputes." 178
Similar observations could be applied to actions of several state
medical boards, especially where the membership is drawn exclusively
from lists supplied by organized medicine. Whether such a constitu-
tional challenge would succeed, however, depends specifically upon the
particular facts of each case, since Gibson involved a clear-cut case of a
state regulatory board controlled by private-practice, fee-for-service
optometrists seeking to exclude from the market competing salaried op-
tometrists. Of course, a successful Gibson challenge, being based upon
due process, requires that the challenged body be engaged in or infused
with state action of the type already described for first amendment pur-
poses. 179
Even where state action for constitutional purposes is unclear,
however, requirements of procedural fairness may be imposed by way
of the antitrust laws. Where a profession is delegated self-regulatory
authority, such powers can be validly exercised only by observing mini-
mal needs of fair process. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,8' the
Court held that the authority of self-regulation granted the stock ex-
change in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not exempt the ex-
change and its members from liability for a group boycott under the
Sherman Act.181 The lack of fairness in the exchange procedures led
the Court to construe the particular act of self-regulation as not im-
mune. "[N]o justification can be offered for self-regulation conducted
without provision for some method of telling a protesting nonmember
why a rule is being invoked so as to harm him and allowing him to
reply in explanation of his position."1' Thus, the Court held that even
where a legitimate and recognized interest exists permitting a restraint
on competition, the restraint must be no more restrictive than is neces-
sary to achieve proper objectives and must, in the process, observe fair
177. Id. at 567. The Board had the power to issue, suspend or revoke licenses for the practice
of optometry. Id
178. Id. at 579.
179. See notes 30, 33 & 35 supra and text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
180. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
181. Id. at 364-65.
182. Id. at 361.
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procedures.18 3
Applied to advertising restrictions used as the basis for sanctions
by private medical organizations or individuals acting with others, or
by government bodies whose decisions are substantially controlled by
physician interests, antitrust liability may result where the restrictions
on physician advertising go beyond what is necessary to protect the
public.184 Moreover, when the procedures of self-regulation do not
comport with established requirements of notice, an opportunity to
know and challenge adverse evidence, a hearing to present one's own
evidence and an unbiased tribunal, antitrust liability may also be im-
posed.185 Now that the doors to antitrust actions against the professions
have been opened, future lawsuits will probably soon begin testing
these standards and procedures on a regular basis. The message to the
professions seems clear: it is time to assure that your house is in order.
C. The Substantive Standard"6
In general it seems likely, even though there is no direct case law
on point, that self-regulation by the professions will be tested by the
usual antitrust rules where such self-regulation is not exempt from the
Sherman Act because of the state action exemption. This means that
price fixing or equivalent conduct (including fee advertising bans), allo-
cation of clients, some forms of group boycotts and perhaps tying ar-
rangements will be subject to per se rules. That is, when a medical
society's regulation of physician practices fits within one of these cate-
gories, antitrust liability will be established upon a showing that the
society engaged in these activities and, in some situations, that a sub-
stantial volume of business was involved or that the society had the
economic power to implement its program. Under most of these cir-
cumstances it will not be necessary to show the actual competitive im-
pact of the practice, nor will an antitrust court hear, much less accept,
organized medicine's justifications for the restraint. 8 7
But it is outside these egregious categories where most of the chal-
lenges are likely to occur--especially if physicians take the precaution-
ary steps of retaining effective counsel and curtailing obviously
anticompetitive practices. And it is here that the rule of reason will be
183. Id. at 364-65.
184. See text accompanying notes 186-205 infra.
185. See text accompanying notes 180-83 supra.
186. See generally Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints on Advertising and
Soliciation by Attorneys, 62 VA. L. Rlv. 1135 (1976).
187. See National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978) (ethical
canon prohibiting engineers from submitting competitive bids violates § I of the Sherman Act "on
its face").
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the antitrust standard. Under the rule of reason approach, the courts
examine the purpose, power and market place effect of the parties' col-
laboration and also consider whether reliance should have been placed
upon less restrictive alternatives to achieve similar ends.
188
There are indications in some recent Supreme Court opinions that
the courts will tread lightly in applying otherwise rigorous antitrust
standards to physician self-regulation. In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy,89 the Court took care to state that pharmacists were differ-
ent from physicians and lawyers: "Physicians and lawyers, for exam-
ple, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional
services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent en-
hanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to under-
take certain kinds of advertising."1 90 A year later, in Bates, the Court
condemned a total ban of all price advertising when applied against an
advertisement for five standardized legal services. But it reached this
result only after a careful rule of reason analysis, albeit under the first
amendment, even though under traditional antitrust analysis the prohi-
bition was clearly illegal. In both cases the Court made clear that
"[a]dvertising [by lawyers] that is false, deceptive, or misleading of
course is subject to restraint."'191
However, the clearest guide suggesting that the professions operate
under a more relaxed antitrust standard was announced in footnote 17
of the Court's opinion in Goldfarb:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic
to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions anti-
trust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service as-
pect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which would properly be viewed as a violation of
the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently .. 92
The Court has given no intimation beyond the minimum fee schedule
tested in Goldfarb as to which situations will be treated more lightly. In
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States193 the Court
188. For a general discussion of the rule of reason standard, see E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST
LAW AND ECONOMICS 219-24 (1976); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 171-
82, 187-92 (1977).
189. See note 6 supra and text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
190. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25 (emphasis supplied).
191. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; accord, Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 &
n.24.
192. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
193. 98 S.Ct 1355 (1978).
Vol. 1978:543]
DUKE LAW JOUR[NAL
ruled that the suppression of competitive bidding was illegal "on its
face."
The question for physician advertising, then, is whether the Court
would view suppression as a per se violation or whether deference to
self-regulation would result in a rule of reason approach. The Court
would most likely treat suppression of price advertising as a per se vio-
lation, in line with nonmedical precedent, but would leave other adver-
tising restraint to a rule of reason. Cases examining concerted refusals
to deal or group boycotts are instructive. Although courts and commen-
tators occasionally point to particular Supreme Court decisions justify-
ing a per se rule applicable to group boycotts, these cases usually can be
distinguished, with the result that a varying standard is applied.1 94 In
AMA v. United States, 195 a local medical society had warned hospitals
that they might lose its approval if they allowed two former members
expelled from the society to use their facilities; the physicians had par-
ticipated in a prohibited group prepaid medical practice. The society
had ruled that salaried medical practice was unprofessional conduct
because it put an intermediary between the physician and the pa-
tient. 9 6 The Court analyzed the practice differently. It condemned the
society's actions as a secondary boycott of the hospitals-a per se viola-
tion-because the "unethical" conduct appeared to affect physician in-
come much more than patient care.'97
On the other hand, where the rational relationship between the
professional rule and public protection is much closer, courts appear
more willing to uphold self-regulation even if enforced by a group boy-
cott.19 Ethical rules, for example, may be primarily designed to insure
the integrity of the enterprise and to protect public interests. This is the
basis upon which disciplinary rules of professional sports
194. See United States v. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978, 982-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), afl'd, 98 S. Ct. 1355 (1978); Surety Title Ins. Agency v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp.
298, 304 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1977).
195. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
196. United States v. AMA, 110 F.2d 703, 706-07 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
197. 317 U.S. at 535-36.
198. Judge Sneed has summarized the legal standard in Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). A particular practice, rule or
regulation of a profession will withstand antitrust challenge only if
[it] serve[s] the purpose for which the profession exists, viz, to serve the public. That is, it
must contribute directly to improving service to the public. Those which only suppress
competition between practitioners will fail to survive the challenge.
549 F.2d at 632. This statement may be too lenient on the professions, however, if read as uphold-
ing rules which have both desirable as well as undesirable purposes or which also have a substan-
tial anticompetitive impact. Cf. E. GELLHOR , supra note 188, at 203-04 (1976). Indeed, Judge
Sneed explicitly recognized that his statement of the legal standard was only a principle rather
than a "blueprint. . .which will resolve all controversies." 549 F.2d at 632.
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leagues-such as those against fighting or gambling-are upheld. In
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society,199 the Supreme Court in
dictum observed that
there are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship
between patient and physician is involved which are quite different
than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial
matters. This Court has recognized that forms of competition usual
in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of
a profession.2°
Whether this statement of a quarter century ago would be followed
today is uncertain. True, the careful analysis of price advertising
prohibitions by the Bates Court may suggest that medicine and law
have a special place. Yet if one looks to the results, where such re-
straints have been invariably condemned after this hand-wringing
analysis, one wonders whether only a more circuitous route has been
added.
The particulars of the AMA's no-solicitation rule prohibiting all
advertising except basic name, office location and type of practice in-
formation is currently under challenge by the FTC.20 1 The AMA's trial
brief argues that these restrictions are necessary to avoid consumer de-
ception, retain patient trust and confidence, and protect service quali-
ty;2°2 the restrictions also comport with state and federal laws.20 3 In
light of the Supreme Court's analysis and dismissal of similar argu-
ments in Bates-admittedly, a first amendment case where only price
advertising for five standard services was at stake-it seems likely that
if a decision on the merits is reached, 2°4 the AMA position will not
succeed.
If a rule of reason analysis is applied, the more difficult questions
(apparently not being addressed in the FTC's action against the AMA)
are what effect, if any, third-party payment practices, the widespread
199. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
200. Id. at 336 (dictum).
201. See AMA, FTC Dkt. No. 9064, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,068 (1975).
202. Brief for Respondent at 53-66, AMA, FTC Dkt. No. 9064, [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 21,068 (1975).
203. Id. 67-73.
204. There may be some doubt, however, as to whether the FTC has jurisdiction over the
AMA. The FTC Act limits the Commission's jurisdiction to entities "organized to carry on busi-
ness for its own profit or that of its members." 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1976). See Community Blood Bank
of Kansas City Area, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1022 (8th Cir. 1969) (FTC without jurisdiction
over nonprofit entity conducted for charitable purposes). The question is whether jurisdiction can,
in this case, be established by showing that the AMA operates for the profit of its members. See
generally FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutri-
tion, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
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availability of insurance and the role of the physician in making con-
sumer choices for the patient should have on the no-advertising rules of
the AMA and local medical societies. If demand is highly inelastic,
wide-open advertising rules could simply result in higher prices. Alter-
natively, the number of consumers without insurance or uninformed of
available low fee services may be so large that advertising could have a
significant effect upon the delivery of medical services. Structurally, the
physician services market is highly individualistic and highly frag-
mented, with most practices limited to solo practitioners or two-person
offices.20 5 This might suggest that the market for physician services is
already sufficiently competitive and that advertising would add little. If
so, current prohibitions may be more acceptable. On the other hand,
specialization and strict licensure restraints point in the other direction.
As this line of questioning suggests, whether current or modified adver-
tising restraints will pass antitrust scrutiny ultimately should depend
upon a factual analysis not possible with the information available to-
day. If it is necessary to speculate, however, it seems doubtful that a
total ban would survive a rule of reason analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
The range of self-regulation permitted the professions is currently
undergoing reexamination. In light of past restrictive practices that pre-
vented virtually all professional advertising under the guise of protect-
ing the public-even though the restraint also clearly protected
monopoly interests and prevented effective competition-this reconsid-
eration is overdue. On the other hand, the courts have moved cau-
tiously and there seems to be no reason for undue alarm in the
professions. Change will come, and it may be disruptive to some; it
should not, however, adversely affect the quality and scope of services
made available to the public.
This reevaluation of past rulings which took a hands-off attitude
toward the professions presents an opportunity for courts and commen-
tators to rethink old doctrines. This has already occurred with the re-
cent extension of the first amendment to commercial speech. The
purpose, of course, is to place more information in the hands of con-
sumers. This is an appropriate task for the first amendment because in
the economy, as in politics, knowledge is power. A basic shift in power
to the consumer is itself a change in the political balance. The ultimate
responsibility for health decisions affecting the consumer lies with the
consumer; he or she makes the immensely important initial decisions
205. A. NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 33-34.
[Vol. 1978:543
PH7854] YSICIA N AD VERTISING
whether to let a complaint go untreated, whether to administer self-
treatment or whether to employ a physician and, if so, which one to
select. If these choices are to be free, they should be informed. In all
probability, the state has a moral duty to encourage the flow of infor-
mation to the general public. It certainly ought not to aid the medical
profession in stemming the flow. The Supreme Court's injection of the
first amendment into professional advertising rightly precludes the
state from taking such a negative role. And if the Bates decision is cor-
rectly applied, it will create a presumption in each case in favor of dis-
closure and will require strong justification for restraints on truthful
advertising.
The first amendment is a specialized tool, however, and a some-
what inflexible one. There are many restrictive practices of the profes-
sions that may adversely affect the consumer and that the first
amendment cannot reach because they do not involve the suppression
of information. Even in the regulation of advertising, there is likely to
be resistance to subjecting every detail of regulation to a constitutional
mandate. If such rulings are placed on first amendment grounds, they
cannot be overturned by legislation. This is not to say that the first
amendment must not inform decisions concerning the regulation of
professional advertising; in the case of attorneys, at least where regula-
tory rules are written and enforced by state supreme courts, the first
amendment is the only effective control on professional self-interest.
But to achieve a fine-tuned policy governing professional regulation
that is responsive to economic nuances, the first amendment is hardly
the ideal instrument.
On the other hand, just the opposite may be said of the Sherman
Act. Its application is appropriate to test the entire range of self-regula-
tion by the professions. Despite declarations of public service and of a
desire to protect the public from misguided efforts at competition, most
professional ethical standards appear to be guided more by monopolis-
tic self-interest than by anything else-the kind of self-interest that the
Sherman Act was designed to control. This fact, furthermore, ought to
justify a presumption against validity when these restrictive practices
are measured against the Sherman Act. This point is urged because it
would involve a reversal of the current judicial approach which deals
so circumspectly with and with such deference to almost every argu-
ment urged by lawyers or physicians in favor of restrictive ethical re-
quirements. Since many, and perhaps most, of these arguments are at
best well-phrased covers for anticompetitive arrangements with little
other justification, they should be considered as such when measured
against the legislative standard favoring competition and its benefits.
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This further suggests that the exemptions from Sherman Act juris-
diction which are still relied upon to protect professional canons from
antitrust scrutiny should be reconsidered and applied narrowly. The
state action defense seems to be a prime candidate for reexamination.
Its main thrust was to protect state sovereignty and to assure that sub-
stantive due process did not reappear in new dress. Neither justification
seems persuasive today.20 6 If we are to have a national antitrust policy,
state sovereignty must give way to federal supremacy, at least in profes-
sional self-regulation. The state action doctrine allows state govern-
ment in this instance to create exceptions to the Sherman Act which
swallow up its rule in whole sectors of the economy. Now that we have
begun to appreciate the importance of the professions to the economy,
especially with the increasing role of the service sector in all phases of
society, the real benefits of competition should not be lost. Studies of
occupational licensure and similar state regulatory schemes have re-
peatedly shown their detrimental impact upon the economy.20 7 If the
Parker doctrine is allowed to stand in its current form and be rein-
forced by citation and reliance, the gains made during the past few
years in curbing the monopolistic tendencies of the professions will be
frustrated and the public ill served.
There is no reason to fear that elimination, or at least narrowing,
of the state action defense would foster the rebirth of substantive due
process and the substitution of the economic ideologies of judges for
206. Specifically, we find the arguments offered by Professors Handler and Verkuil, supra
note 132, and especially their fears of a narrowed state action rule, unjustified. They rely primarily
upon concerns that many state regulatory programs would be overridden, regulated firms would
be unfairly subjected to treble damage liability (which was also a concern of the Supreme Court in
oral argument in Bates) and the people's will, as expressed in state legislation, would be subject to
being overruled by capricious federal judges. On the other hand, state regulations inconsistent
with other federal laws (e.g., federal labor laws) are generally held to minimum standards of
consistency. See Bartosic, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: The Allocation of Power in Deciding
Labor Law Policy, 62 VA. L. REv. 533 (1976). Applied to state economic regulation, the "state
action" doctrine should exempt only state regulatory programs that assure the benefits of competi-
tion and involve active state enforcement. Thus, public utility regulation of natural monopolies
(e.g., telephone rates, water and sewer systems) would survive as would most, but not all, state
regulation. The problem of fairness apparently could be resolved in the same manner that crimi-
nal enforcement is handled under the Sherman Act, despite its vagueness; that is, new extensions
of the Sherman Act should be developed in declaratory judgment or equitable actions for injunc-
tions. Private treble damages should not be available retrospectively as the result of such exten-
sions. Cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (prospective overruling in constitutional
litigation). Finally, there seems to be no reason either to pay greater heed to state legislative judg-
ments (as compared to those made by Congress) here than in other contexts or to accept the
conjecture that federal judges will ignore the substantial gloss on the Sherman Act in applying it
where private or quasi-public conduct is for the first time undergoing federal antitrust challenge.
The federal judiciary has not been particularly active in extending antitrust liability.
207. B. SHIMBERG, B. ESSER, & D. DRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND
POLICIES (1972); Gellhorn, he Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1976).
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those of the legislatures. This is because the exemption's removal
would not be a license to judges to insert their own views; the Sherman
Act would still be applied and it has a well-defined scope and rationale.
Nor would state regulation be overturned in every respect. Rather, the
effect would be that state regulation could not be relied upon to avoid
antitrust liability for collaborative action. To the extent that the profes-
sions do not engage in otherwise illegal joint action, or that interstate
commerce is unaffected, the state regulation would continue. In light of
the liberal interpretation given professional standards under the rule of
reason---even if reinterpreted to place on the profession the burden of
justifying the restrictive practice-the standards would be upheld
where the likely or realized benefits outweighed the costs or risks.
Moreover, any possible judicial introduction of personal value judg-
ments could be closely monitored by Congress since the courts would
be interpreting a legislative command (the Sherman Act) rather than
the Constitution, as was the case with substantive due process. Recent
congressional revisions of the antitrust laws indicate that legislative
control of judicial pronouncements is not as difficult as it once ap-
peared.
The Court has taken an important step in opening the professions
to competition. The strong bias the Court has exhibited for freedom to
speak and compete should be strengthened and encouraged. Continu-
ing restraints developed by the professions or their regulatory agencies
should be approved only if narrowly drawn to meet particular needs
and after solid justifications have been established. Loosely drawn
prohibitions covering desirable as well as undesirable actions should be
avoided. Perhaps then the professions' performance will more nearly
match their promise.
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